I’m pleased to announce the publication of my fifth book Export Controls: A Contemporary History from the publisher University Press of America and via
Amazon.com in cloth and electronic editions.
This work examines how the U.S. has used economic sanctions such as export controls to try to influence and change the foreign policy behavior of hostile countries and transnational organizations around the world. It’s time frame covers from just after World War II to the present though it covers some pre-World War II developments such as enactment of World War I’s Trading With the Enemy Act.
Topics addressed in this work include important laws the U.S. has used to implement foreign economic policy, foreign policy, and national security objectives such as the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, Arms Export Control Act, International Emergency Economic Powers Act, and others. It examines the multiple U.S. Government agencies involved in formulating and implementing export control policy including the Commerce Department, Defense Department, Energy Department and Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Department of Homeland Security, Justice Department, State Department, and Treasury Department. Countries and organizations targeted by these U.S. agencies and statutes include China, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, the former Soviet Union and Russia, Syria, Al Qaida, the Haqqani Network, and the Taliban. It also examines the role played in export control policymaking by multiple congressional oversight committees, non-governmental organizations such as export oriented trade associations, research universities who frequently have multiple personnel who make sure their institutions adhere to often conflicting federal export control policies, and international government organizations involved in this arena such as the International Atomic Energy Agency, Missile Technology Control Regime, European Union, foreign national governments, Proliferation Security Initiative, and the UN Small Arms Treaty.
This work should be of interest to those studying international economics, international trade, diplomatic coercion and sanctions, military sales, weapons smuggling, domestic and international government policymaking, and numerous related fields. The author makes suggestions for enhancing the efficiency for the U.S.’ stovepipes and frequently dysfunctional export control policymaking architecture and concludes by saying that the U.S. and other countries will use export controls to advance their policymaking objectives as long as they are unable and/or unwilling to take covert or overt military action against offending individuals, transnational organizations, and countries whose behavior we are displeased with.